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ABSTRACT
THE PLACE OF THE PHILOSOPHER

February 1986

Jeffrey Barja Diamond, B.A.
U.C. Berkeley
M.A., University of Massachusetts
Directed by Professor N. Xenos
The text of this essay falls in three
sections, and is chiefly

organized around

discussion of the development, consequences, and

a

legitimacy of three notions, or understandings,
which have profoundly
shaped reflective and philosophical inquiry.

understandings are:

Put briefly, these

that the use and meaning of our concepts are

essentially determined by general principles or rules;
that cultural
conventions, because they are artifacts, are consequently
"artificial"

--indifferent or opposed to what is genuine and true; and that the
purpose and role of the mind and language is to correctly represent
to us the objects of the world.
In the first section we shall

examine individually the appearance

of these notions in Greek antiquity.

In the second section, we look

at their re-emergence or reinvigoration as

a

part of the intellectual

shift occurring in the early modern era, and at

a

subsequent analysis

and critique by Hegel of the self-understanding in which they each

play

a

role.

In the third section, as

in the first two, attention is

given to the consequences of these understandings--fostering
intellectual isolation, elitism, and paradox.

But in this final

section, the analysis and critique is carried further with the help of
the philosophical

perspective of Ludwig Wittgenstein.
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INTRODUCTION

Reflection necessarily both presupposes
and entails

degree of detachment.

a

certain

It involves a kind of "stepping
back" to view

things differently from how we do when
we are going about the business
of our lives.

During the course of our cultural

history, the practice

of reflecting has been constituted and
shaped in particular ways.

One

result of some of these ways is that sometimes
that "step back" looks

more like
And as

a

a

chasm separating the thinker and the world he
lives in.

consequence, the vastness of this distance may undermine
the

usefulness of that view which reflection was meant to provide.
This essay will attempt to sketch the development and conse-

quences of chiefly three conceptions, which together have profoundly
shaped the tradition of Western philosophical thought.

Finally, in

the third section, the legitimacy of these understandings will be

explored with the help of insights largely derived from the thought
of Ludwig Wittgenstein.

1

chapter
DISCUSSION

II

I

Aristotle describes the experience
of "wonder that things are
as they are" as the beginning of
philosophy.''

The historical origin

of philosophy is often considered
the speculations of the Ionian

nature philosophers

.of

the 6th century B.C.

Prior to this time it

seems people did not so much offer what
we might call

explanations," but rather mythological ones.

"rational

According to Sheldon

Wolin, before the nature philosophers, "men
were concerned not with

things operated but what superhuman agency was
directing

'how'

them."

It

probably possible to overstate the distinctness of

is

"pre and post-philosophical" thought; but this does not
belie the

occurrence of an important shift.
The objects of speculation and discussion by the nature philoso-

phers were often such things as fire, water, earth, and air.

They

were interested here not in this or that fire, or this or that piece
of earth--the specific entities which one comes across in one's

non-intellectual or philosophical encounters with the world.

They

spoke of general entities, and it is this sort of entity which serves
as the object of inquiries asking, for instance,

of
in the

.

"

"what is the nature

That is, these general concepts had their place not

everyday experience which dealt with particular fires and such,

but in those activities reflecting

a

attitude.

2

speculative or philosophical

3

Just as such intellectual practices
as considering the nature,

causes, dangers, uses, etc. of fire
(in general) are familiar to
us,
so the general concepts which
are part of these practices are
naturally
also familiar.

But this may not always have been
so.

Bruno Snell

argues that the linguistic construction
used to express

a

general

concept in Greek only came into use after
the writing of the Homeric
epics.

This construction consists of

conjunction with

a

a

singular definite article in

noun, adjective, or verb in the infinitive.

for instance the article

Thus

followed by the noun hydor is translated

by the general concept "water".

According to Snell, the generic article does not appear
in Homer,
nor even yet in Hesiod.

For instance, whereas Plato employs the

generic article in speaking of "justice", Hesiod uses the plural of
the

article and noun--suggesting to Snell
individual just acts."^

meaning like "the series of

a

Similarly Snell claims that the constructions

in Homer suggest that ancient thought had no general

horse in Homer is never the concept of

a

concept:

"the

horse (the notion of that
r

animal as

a

species), but always

to which general

a

particular horse."

The extent

concepts do appear in early Greek writing

form of personifications.

Thus "fear"

(

is

in the

phobos ) is represented as

demon.

Some classicists have voiced skepticism about what sort of

conclusions can be made from the linguistic evidence which Snell
interprets.

The fact that the Greeks may not have had words for

general concepts does not preclude the possibility that they could
still

conceive in that manner.

As Snell

himself shows, Cicero

a

4

expressed general concepts circuitously
in Latin which had no
specific formulations for general
concepts.^ But it is significant
that no such circuitous constructions
seem to appear in early Greek,
and it would be difficult to deny
that Snell

is on to

something about

the conceptual-linguistic development
which fostered not only the
Ionian nature philosophies, but
subsequent philosophical

speculation

as well.

Among subsequent philosophers, Socrates is
often credited with

a

role in the history of ethics analogous to
that which the Ionian

philosophers played in the history of nature philosophy.
the account in the Phaedo
of Anaxagoras'

According to

as a young man Socrates undertook the study

,

philosophy, but found its "scientific" and naturalistic

approach unsatisfying.

For Socrates the important questions concerned

the purpose and meaning of all the things in the universe--he sought
to discover "what is best for each and what is the universal good."^

Futhermore, by discussing the ethical notions which men lived by

without recourse to mythological authority, Socrates set ethical
speculation and inquiry

on

a

new footing.

According to Cicero and

others, Socrates' greatest achievement was that he brought philosophy
down "from heaven to earth", and to the everyday life of men.^

Hegel

excoriates these later philosophers insofar as they thus construe
Socrates'

philosophy as

a

"domestic or fireside philosophy, which

conforms to all the ordinary ideas of men."^*^

In truth,

it was only

because Socrates did bring speculation and inquiry down to earth and
and everyday life that he succeeded in challenging the accepted wisdom
of his time.

:
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Socrates' method consists of
inducing another to pose

a

claim as

to the nature of courage or
friendship or some such
thing-thereby

supplying the "material" for
the philosophic exercise-,
Socrates then
applies himself to this material
by questioning and probing.
Socrates
typically begins the discussion by
directing his interlocutor in a

manner similar to that seen
Euthyphro.

death of

a

in the following

passage from the

Euthyphro is seeking to prosecute
his father for the
servant.

Since Socrates is himself present
at the court

to answer charges of impiety, he asks
Euthyphro for a definition so

that he may "have it to turn to, and use
as

a

standard whereby to

judge your actions and those of other men."^'

Their discussion

continues

Soc:

I
suppose that piety is the same in all actions, and
that
impiety is always the opposite of piety, and retains
its
identity, and that, as impiety, it always has the same
character which will be found in whatever is impious.

Euth:

Certainly, Socrates,

Soc:

Tell me, then, what is piety and impiety?

I

suppose so.

However, after Euthyphro's response, Socrates directs him again:

Soc:

...please try to give a more definite answer to the question
which I asked you just now.
What I asked you, my friend, was,
what is piety? and you have not explained it to me to my
satisfaction.
You only tell me that what you are doing now,
namely, prosecuting your father for murder is a pious act.

Euth:

Well, that is true Socrates.

Soc:

Very likely.
Euthyphro?

Euth:

Certainly.

But many other actions are pious, are they not,

6

Soc:

Remember, then,

did not ask you to tell me one
or two of all
^
what is
characteristir
haracteristic of piety which makes all
pious actions pious. 12

Here, and in

a

I

number of other dialogues, Socrates
introduces

the general concept into ethical
discussion:

in order to know what

piety is, one must know what it is
"itself," i.e. not just instances
of it.

Since Socrates this notion has become
part of our common

stock of understandings.

But the consistent difficulty which
Euthyphro

and others have in grasping Socrates'
meaning in this respect suggests

that this way of putting things, and the
intellectual practice it

corresponds to, was not yet familiar to Socrates'
contemporaries.
In fact,

Euthyphro's response was in

within the context of

a

a

sense an appropriate one

more traditional Greek ethical discourse.

This traditional ethical discourse consisted not of
teaching by

definitions, but by examples--of which the poets offered many.^^
However, the "language game", as Wittgenstein might say, that Socrates

introduces is of

a

different sort:

it invites its participants to

search themselves and attempts to systematical ly formulate what it is
they believe, and then exposes this formulation to criticism--or

better put--to guided self-criticism.
In this way the socratic practice of philosophy represented an

important and valuable tool in achieving greater self-awareness.
But in so doing Socrates postulated

a

theoretical knowledge (even if

not for mere mortals) above and beyond the knowledge of particular,

practical applications.

And as we shall see, this eventually proves

to be a problematic postulation.

7

In that early "mythological
era" of Greek history.

It appears
that people did not conceive
of custom as something
"merely conventional", and conceptually
opposed to nature. As Wolin
says.

Prior to the development of
Greek philosophy In the slvth
century B.C., man had thought
of himsel? a d Sc^etv If
formed

contlnffu
Or as F.M. Cornford puts it:

a

"custom and nature were at one."^^

Even for the nature philosophers
the conceptual boundaries
appear quite

different from our own, and later,
thought.

For instance, for

Anaximander, the principle of disruption
in human affai rs-adi ke,
often translated as "injustice"-is
also the principle of change in the
natural world.

Heraclitus likens

the city, hence expressing both

conceptual distinctness.

a

law of the universe to the law of

a

commonality, but clearly also

a

Moreover, he claims, "all human laws are

nourished by one, which is divine," and thus
envisions human laws as
subordinate and derivative of
universe.

^

a

higher law which orders the

^

The Greek word here translated "law"— nomos --also has
the sense

"custom", and in the hands of sophists the relationship of
subordination of human laws and customs to

formed into

a

a

divine and natural law is trans-

relationship of antagonism and contradiction.

instance, Plato has Hippias say "law

many things through against nature."

(

nomos

)

For

the tyrant of men forces

Antiphon himself says, "Most

of the prescriptions of law are hostile to nature.

Even before the

Hellenistic era, growing cosmopolitanism not only shook the faith in
parochial customs, but brought into question the legitimacy of custom

8

Itself.

Similarly, the frequent alteration
and repeal of laws during
the classical era undermined
the legitimacy of law as
such; for this
reason Aristotle considered it
better for a state to maintain
its laws,

rather than constantly change
them-even if the changes themselves
were each improvements.^^
In the R epublic and the
Gorgias,

the one thing which Socrates
and

Thrasymachus or Callicles agree on is
that what justice really is, has
nothing to do with custom or human
convention.
Callicles, for instance,
charges Socrates with entangling his
interlocutors with the mere

convention of justice.

Only he himself is willing to say
what others

only think-shed the cultural hypocrisy
and escape the grip of society,

which keeps them from the truth, namely
that, "both among all animals
and in entire states and races of mankind
it is plain that... right is

recognized to be the sovereignty of the stronger
over the weaker.
But for Plato the truth is not to be found in
the natural, any

more than in the conventional.

Plato appears to give his account of

the discovery of truth in the "allegory of the
cave."

describes

a

scene in which

since childhood in

a

a

collection of men have been chained

cave in such a way that they are unable to move

their heads and look around.

Their gaze is fixed straight ahead,

opposite the entrance of the cave.
them and the fire is

The allegory

a

Behind them burns

a

fire.

Between

parapet, like that which puppeteers use to hide

themselves while they manipulate the puppets sticking up over the top.
Socrates asks his audience to imagine "persons carrying along
various artificial objects, including figures of men and animals in

9

wood or stone or other materials,
which project over the parapet.
The inhabitants of the cave
see nothing of these figures
but the
shadows on the cave wall in
front of them, and hear only
the echoes.

Consequently,

men

so chained would recognize
nothing but the shadows

of those artificial objects.

Now one of the prisoners is set
free, and made to face what had
been behind him.
He is unaccustomed to the light
of the fire:
his
eyes hurt and he cannot see clearly.

But eventually his sight adjusts

and he comes to realize that what
we had previously taken to be
the

truth were only shadows.
He is then forced up out of the
cave--out of the faint light

of the fire into the bright light of
day.

again his eyes adjust.

Again he is blinded, but

Now for the first time he is able to
see the

objects of the "real" world; then he turns his
eyes to the sky, and

finally he is able to view the sun itself.
Let us now interpret the allegory.

found human society and its products;
men, and their creations

stone and such.

misdirection

— those

Within the cave is to be
this is a world populated by

"artificial objects" of wood and

But most men do not even see these things;
of their thinking chains them to

shadows of these things.

a

the

view of only the

Thus, for instance, Callicles does not even

see what "human justice" is--that artifact of the cave; he sees only
its shadow, and so misperceives even the world of merely human law and

convention.
But the prisoner in the allegory is not allowed to stop at the

point of gaining

a

true view of what is there in the cave.

He is forced
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to leave that realm of
"artificial

objects" and the light of
the man-

It is only upon leaving
the human community of
the cave

that the philosopher sees
real things-not mere
representations-in
the true light.
Socrates is explicit that
the naturalism of this
realm of truth is only
metaphorical. The truth is not
to be found in
Physical nature, but in the
invisible and purely intellectual
world of
ideas or "forms."

The picture of the philosophical
enterprise given in the allegory
of the cave is one in which the
philosopher must cut himself loose

from the thinking of his community
and climb up out of society and
custom, if he is to see the true
nature of things.
So, as it was for

Callicles, here too the philosopher
must free himself of his society's
hold on him and its conventions and
artifice.

At least since Plato's

time, this notion that philosophy
must penetrate not only beyond

conventional understandings, but beyond
convention itself, has been

commonplace in Western intellectual history.

entrenched understanding appear to have been

a

Two results of this
a

tendency to reinforce

philosophers' sense of alienation from their cultures,
and

a

tendency

to preclude inquiry into just what sort of
truth conventions might be

found to have.

The word which is commonly translated as "true", and is used in

reference to the successive stages in the allegory of the cave--that of
shadows, of firelight and artificial objects, and of daylight and real

objects--is in the Greek

al

ethes

.

It appears

in the normal

attributive.
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comparative, and superlative forms
corresponding with the stages of
the
allegory.
The word consists of a prefix
indicating negation, and a
stem related to a verb normally
translated something like "to escape
the notice of." Hence Heidegger
suggests as a more appropriate translation "unhidden":
he thus characterizes the stages
as concerning
"the unhidden", "more unhidden", and
"most unhidden".

And for Heideg-

ger, what is most significant in the
allegory of the cave is

a

Shift in the meaning of aletheia--''unhiddenness"
The allegory of the cave is the story
of the philosopher coming
in

closer and closer contact with the unhidden,
until finally he

leaves the cave.

Outside the cave he eventually traces back to
the

source of the light which makes possible his vision.

As Socrates

explains, the sun is meant to represent the "idea of the
Good."

word here translated "good"

(

agathon )

,

The

does not so much mean "morally

upright", but rather "useful" or "fi tti ng"--the "idea of the
Good" is

what gives things their meaning and use.^^

The idea of the Good is

a

standard by which the philosopher may judge the conduct and actions
of those back in the world of the cave, for it is what "anyone who is

going to act rationally either in public or private affairs must have

sight of."
(to know)

26

It gives "unhi ddenness to what is known and the ability

to him who knows,"

unhiddenness

.

.

71

and is "itself master, dispensing both

.and the ability to perceive."

According to Heidegger

this represents a philosophical and ontological supplanting of the

original notion and experience of aletheia

:

"truth no longer is, as

unhiddenness, the basic feature of being itself.
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This should become more
clear as we consider the
last part of
the allegory of the cave.
After having been brought
out of the cave,
and after having viewed real
objects and the sun, the former
prisoner
returns to the cave, where he
may try to enlighten some of
his fellows
as he was himself enlightened.
Socrates argues that the knowledge
of
the "forms"-those real objects,
outside of the cave-is innate within
us, though we fail

to see it.

Thus the philosophical task is
to get

oneself and others not to be "either
turned in the wrong direction or
looking the wrong way.-^O

„

fellows he must force them to turn their
eyes from the wall, around to
the fire, and ultimately, up out of
the cave.

Hence Heidegger says

The transition from one situation into
another consists in
making one s glance more correct.
Everything depends on the
prtho^,_ the correctness of the glance. Through this
correctness, seeing and recognizing become something
right, so that it
eventually be directed straight ahead to
the Highest Idea, and made fast in this
"straigtening-out."
In
this directing of itself, perceiving is compared
to what is
supposed to be sighted...
In consequence. .an omoiosis subsists,
an agreement between recognizing and the thing
itself .31
.

What is involved here, according to Heidegger, is
in the philosophical

significance of truth.

a

transformation

The philosopher has ceased

to orient himself by the pursuit of truth in the sense of
what was

"to the Greeks the self-evident and fundamental experience of
aletheia
OO

the unhiddenness of beings."

Instead he takes the primary sense of

"truth "-- aletheia- - to be "correctness", demoting "unhiddenness" to

subordinate and derivative status.
"

a

Thus, when aletheia is said,
oo

orthotes is meant and set as

a

standard"

to rule and judge the

thought and actions of men (back in the cave).

Paradoxically, what

the philosopher most seeks as truth in the sense of "unhiddenness"--

,

.
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that which is

nearest to being", i.e., most
real-he then construes

as truth in the sense of
correctness, agreement of word
or perception
and thing, as the idea of the
Good.

While the specific understanding
of the "unhiddenness of beings"
is

perhaps no longer

a

part of our modern experience,
our present

notion of truth does admit of
that of "correctness".

roughly similar sense, distinct from

a

When we speak of "a true friend",
"true love",

or "true grit", we do not mean "a
correct friend", "correct love",

or

correct grit"; here "true" means something
like "real" or

"genuine"

However, since Plato the understanding of
truth as "correctness"
has dominated Western philosophy:

"from now on the mold of the

essence of truth becomes, as the correctness of
representing through
an assertion, the standard for all of Western
thi nking

cites Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, and Nietzsche:

all

.

Heidegger

agree that "truth"

"the agreement of mental concept (or representation) with
the
„35
thing."
For Heidegger the significance of the philosophical transis

formation of "truth" from "unhiddenness" to "correctness" lies in the

alienation from the world it bespeaks,

"as unhiddenness truth is

still a basic feature of beings themselves.

ness" is not

a

But truth as "correct-

feature of, nor does it refer to, beings; it only

applies to consciousness and statements.

philosopher now pursues is not

a

Hence the truth which the

fundamental characteristic of the

world, but is rather "the label of the human attitude towards beings."^"^
And by posing the question of truth in terms of an "atti tude"--the

right direction of the mind's gaze--the philosopher does not by his

14

efforts reach anything which
selves.

is

a

characteristic of beings them-

That is, the conception of
truth as "correctness" posits

a

duality of consciousness and
the world, its object, but
refers only
to consciousness; truth
construed as an orientation of
consciousness
towards things, is thus essentially
about consciousness, not about
things.
Truth conceived exclusively as
"correctness" implies a

self-referring philosophical subjectivity,
locked-out and estranged
from what the things of the world
are in and of themselves.
In a section of her essay "What
is Authority", Arendt borrows

from Heidegger's discussion of
Plato's conception of truth.

Arendt

s

shedding

But

own contribution to this discussion
consists largely of
a

Heidegger.

political

light on some of the issues developed
by

According to Arendt, in

a

number of dialogues not

treating of political subjects, such as the
Symposium
even in the first books of the Republic

,

,

Phaedrus

,

and

the philosopher is defined not

as a pursuer of the idea of the Good, but
rather of "the beautiful"
(in classical

Greek it seems that "the beautiful" would be understood

as very close to truth in the sense of "unhiddenness")

Furthermore,

Arendt points out that Socrates only introduces "correctness"
as the
meaning of truth in the last portion of the allegory of the cave, when
the former prisoner returns to his unenlightened society.

The

significance for Arendt of the transformation of the conception of
truth is that truth becomes construed as

ruling the social world.

a

standard and measure for

It is when the philosopher is forced to

confront his society as an immediate problem that he "resorts to what
he has seen, the ideas, as standards and measures, and finally... uses

15

them as instruments of
domination.
The lives of the many
in the cave over
whom the philosopher

envisions establishing

contemplation, but by

a

rule of reason "are
characterized not by

l^s,

speech, and

jirMs. action."^

This
fact is, however, contrary
to the depiction in
the allegory:
here
what is represented as
fundamental is these men's
And it is
with respect to their sight
that they are subject to
the philosopher's
"correction".
Thus Arendt says, the
philosopher's intrusion into
human affairs is

s^.

justified not only by an absolute
priority of seeinq over
doing, of contemplation over
speaking and

acting but also
men human is the urge to
see
Hence the interest of the
philosopher Ind the interest
of the man coincide; both demand
that human affairs the
results of speech and action,
must not acquire a dignity of
do">ination of something
outs^d^thei^ rLlm^il"*^'*
The authority of the philosopher
as such to correct or govern
the proceedings of his society
presupposes the subordination of those

aspects of life to philosophic knowledge
and standards.

As Arendt

suggests this constitutes an imposition
or projection of the philosopher
upon the social world, thus entailing

a

systematic blindness to the

independence and dignity which that world
possesses of itself.
What can be seen as emerging from the discussions
by Heidegger
and Arendt is

a

network of mutually reinforcing or implying under-

standings and experiences.

With the conception of truth as the

accurate representation in word or thought of things,
we see the
isolation of the merely sel f-referring subjectivity, and
consequently
the failure to attain to "what things are in themselves"; the failure

16

to see beyond "subjective
projection" to what things are in
themselves

ensures that the (cultural) world
appears irrational and in need of
correction; and as Arendt suggests,
the prospect of confronting
this
cultural world may partially underlie
the psychological impetus behind

construing philosophical truth as

a

"correctness", as

a

standard.

Now add to this existential and intellectual
network the notion
that the meaning of

a

concept as sought in philosophy is

a

defining

principle, and as such is prior to the responsible
practical use of the

concept in particular circumstances.

Also add the notion that

a

society's conventions are necessarily "artificial",
and to be escaped
in the pursuit of truth and reality.

Now we have

a

critical sketch

of a predicament which has characterized much of Western
intellectual
thought.

chapter

III

discussion

II

In the previous section we
looked briefly at the disruption
of

what Is believed to have been

a pre-phi

continuity and Immediacy in the
world.

losophical Greek experience of
It has often been noted that

the period of transition to our
modern era manifests some similarities
to that earlier time of transition;
that there might be similarities

should not be surprising given the
cultural overlap, and the at
least roughly parallel trends towards
expanded trade and urbanization.

Michel

Foucault describes the pre-modern medieval
and

renaissance world-view as comprising
resemblances and similitudes.

a

unified complex hierarchy of

He cites the renaissance thinker. Porta,

as follows:

As with respect to its vegetation the plant
stands convenient
to the brute beast, so through feeling does
the brutish animal
to man, who is comfortable to the rest of the
stars by his
i n te 1 1
these links proceed so strictly that they appear
i gence i
as a rope stretched from the first cause as far as
the lowest

and smallest of things

In this world the distinction between man and nature
is only one

of degree:

for the overall pattern is one of continuity.

world the behavior of natural entities and beings
also used for human motivation and emotion.

is

In this

reckoned in terms

Human society represented

both an integrated part of the cosmic whole, and

a

microcosm of it;

divine law, natural law, and human law were linked in an ontological
hierarchy.

But this cosmic hierarchy of law was eventually to be

replaced to an increasing extent by

a

vision of legal antagonism.

The

16th century poet Greville laments the human condition in which we are
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"Born to one law and to
another bound, ... What
meaneth nature by
these diverse laws, Passion
and Reason, self-division's
cause.
Moreover, from approximately
this time on, human society
ceased
to seem continuous with,
and founded upon, the
cosmic order. As Wolin
suggests, "men no longer felt
that the community represented
a natural
unity."
Hobbes' observation that "by
art is created that great
Leviathan called a Commonweal th,"«
merely expressed an understanding
Which other men had been acting
upon for the better part of
a century.

Besides positing the cosmos as

a

"Great Chain of Being," this

pre-modern outlook also understood
the universe to consist of
signs
and meanings hidden within its
objects themselves; the concealed
truth of these objects was to be read
or interpreted from their

appearance.

Thus Crollius poses the rhetorical
question, "Is it not

true that all herbs, plants, trees and
other things issuing from the

bowels of the earth are so many magic books
and signs?"^^

God had

written the very nature and essence of his works
upon their outward
aspects.

Hence, for instance, the appearance of the walnut
meat

indicated that it was medicine for ailments of the brain.

something

s

Moreover,

meaning and essence was not only given by the signs

located in its physical appearance, but also by the pertinent language
of other "texts".

The entirety of recorded thought and experience of

every aspect of an object or being was essential to the definition of
what it was.

According to Foucault, learned exposition of the objects of the
natural world took the form of what were known as "histories":
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“"ipletely unitary

co5fAr^iv;ir;s!"iSenE?r

HiSiirthe to

-

i^s
t^the

mV?"

connected it

Thus, for instance one chapter
of Aldrovandis' Historia
s erpentum

et draconum contains the
following headings:

equivocation
(which means the various meanings
of the word "serpent"),

synonyms and etymologies, differences,
form and description,
anatomy, nature and habits, temperament,
coitus and generation,
voice, movements, places, diet, physiognomy,
antipathy, empathy,

modes of capture, death and wounds caused
by the serpent, fables,
emblems and symbols, proverbs, simulacra and
statues, dietary
uses, medical uses, --to give only

a

partial

list.^®

The specifics

to be known comprised essentially all the
various contexts in which

"serpents" were encountered in experience and

1

iterature— from

the dinner table to fables and dreams.
In attempting to account for the manifold categories
for

consideration appearing the in pre-modern writings on natural
history, Foucault argues that this phenomenon can
not be
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explained by saying "science
was hesitating between
a rational
vocation and the vast weight
of naive tradition, but
for the

much more precise and
constraining reason that
signs were then
pert of things themselves,
whereas In the seventeenth
century
they become modes of
representation."^^
This needs to be further
explained.

Foucault argues that

by the early 17th century.
Western thought had undergone
a

profound transformation with
respect to the nature of the
objects
of the world and the language
which had previously determined
them.

Words and signs are no longer
Inseparable from the essence

of things themselves; now they merely
report on, or represent,
things.

Foucault says:

Language is no longer one of the figurations
of the
world, or a signature stamped upon things
since the
beginning of time.
The manifestation and sign of
truth are to be found in evident and distinct
perception.
It is the task of words to translate
that
truth if they can; but they no longer have the
right
to be considered a mark of it.
Language has withdrawn
from the midst of beings themselves and entered
a
period of transparency and neutral ity. 52
This passage may conjure up the image of Descartes,
whose "clear
and distinct" perceptions were to serve him as the source
of the

truth of the world.

But the understanding that correct perception

is the basis of knowledge about things, and that language, at
its best,

transparently reproduces the perceptual mental representation of these
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things, was not at this
time unique to Descartes.

In fact, Foucault's
point is that the intellectual
primacy of direct perception,
and a
conception of language consistent
with this orientation,
were
central to the spirit of the
age.
For instance, Hobbes says

li^h'ob^ecrworL^^o^'ihe lye^Trcs" an"o?h"

The role of language is simply
to "transfer our mental
discourse
into verbal."

54

For Hobbes, and his contemporaries,
language simply

serves to convey the thoughts given by
perception:

words are names

designating objects and qualities-in
sentences they reproduce the perceptual representations, and so take the
form of propositions.

Thus

the primary structure of language is the
statement of the general
form, "This is that."

The intellectual orientation emerging in the
17th century in which

men

s

experience of the world is mediated by representations--mental

and verbal -represents some new problems.
problem:

Foucault discusses one such

"from the seventeenth century, one began to ask how

could be linked to what it signified!'^^

a

sign

The connection between the
(

posited duality of minds and bodies became
to ask,

a

question.

One was forced

"how are these representations, in here, related to those

things, out there?"

Thus from the 17th century on, epistemology

became the predominant philosophical area of inquiry, and skepticism
the logical

conclusion.

that, "these words

Furthermore, when we consider Hobbes' claim

'true',

'truth', and

'true proposition', are
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equivalent to one another;
for truth consists
in speech, and
not in
the things spoken of," ®
we may come to recognize
in the intellectual
orientation of the first
centuries of the modern
era something bearing
a strong resemblance
to that constellation
of understandings and
experiences earlier partially
characterized by "truth as
correctness."
Foucault attempts to
illustrate what he takes
to be the spirit of
this age by means of the
17th century painting Las
Heninas . by Velasquez (see illustration
#1).
i„ the foreground
is an entourage surrounding the Infanta Margarita,
who looks straight ahead
of her.
Off
to the left of the Infanta
is Velasquez himself;
having stepped back
momentarily, he surveys his work.
In the background a man
looks on
from the steps behind an open
door.
But also in the background
on
the far wall hangs a mirror:

in the mirror we see the
reflection of

two people standing in front
of the depicted scene-King
Philip IV
and Queen Mariana.
It is they whom the depicted
artist is portraying.
It is due to their presence
that the Infanta and entourage
are

assembled.

And it is for them and their gaze
that the work is executed.

But there is something odd about
this scene.

When the royal

couple view the representation of that
world which they inhabit, they
nowhere find themselves.

All

they see of themselves is a reflection,

and this reflection is strangely isolated
from all else that inhabits
that world:

for the mirror is located behind the other
figures, yet

their images are excluded from the reflection.

In this

representation

of the world of the intended spectators, the
spectators see

a

mere

reflection of themselves--one which denies their relation
to the
Other beings of their world.
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ILLUSTRATION

#1

,
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Thus Foucault suggestively
presents the situation of
early
modern subjectivity, a
situation in .any respects
with us today.
While
Foucault does not hi.self
explicitly raise the issue,
one need not
dig too deeply into the
writings of 17th and 18th
century philosophers
to uncover evidence of the
impulse to set straight
non-phi losophical
thought and practices, which
was previously here
associated with "truth
as correctness."
Hume, for instance, seeks
to put right not only
"false philosophy", but also
what the vulgar, in its "common
and

careless way of thinking"®^
imagines itself to perceive.
In fact the characteristic
form of philosophical

insight for

many thinkers of the age was,
"strictly speaking (really), things
are not as they seem when loosely
speaking-i .e. , as we ordinarily
speak.

Thus. Hobbes "discovers" that
"there

(really) which we call an image of
colour.

is

nothing without us

Furthermore, the basis

upon which Hobbes attempts to construct
his syllogisms is the

definition":

that which "gives an universal notion of
the thing

defined, representing

mind."

a

certain universal picture thereof... to the

By means of exhaustive lists of such
definitions, Hobbes

sets out to correct the usages of others, and
to put the speech and

thought of his society on

a

more sure and stable footing.

And

neither is this corrective impulse particular to Hobbes,
nor confined
to purely philosophical

speech and thought.

For Hobbes, and for

numerous other intellectuals the impulse to arrange and order social
and political

life is evident.

It is the impulse of "reform"--! .e.

change from the (intellectual) top down.
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According to Foocaolt, the
philosophical predominance
of the
thought in which “representation"
plays

close at the end of the
18th century.

a

central role comes to a

Clearly the transformation
of

people's intellectual character
or orientation does not
come about
all at once or absolutely.
As Michael Oakeshott
suggests, ways of
thinking change like styles
of architecture; undeniably,
but often
gradually and imperceptably.“
However, a function of philosophy
a

is

to give expression to thought
and experience which otherwise
remains

inarticulate within the culture; thus
when we view the works of
great philosophers, we often see the
transitions in intellectual

orientation as if in bold relief.

One important thinker who both

conceived of this particular understanding
of philosophy, and of
himself as the intellectual expression
of

a

new age to be constrasted

with the earlier era characterized by
"representation", is Hegel.
In one of Hegel's principal works,

the Phenomenology of Spirit ,

he attempts to trace the progression of
consciousness from what we

might call "mere consciousness"--somethi
ng like what
animal, might have--to

awareness.

In fact,

a

a

baby, or

fully realized self-consciousness and self-

the Phenomenology

,

which presents the path of

this progression to the consciousness of its reader,
itself thus

constitutes "the end" and summation of this process of self-realization:

consciousness, reflecting on its own historical development,

finally arrives at the place it now occupies--that of reflecting upon
its own reflecting.

However, for our purposes here, it will be enough

to excerpt a few stages from the phenomenological

outline certain tendencies in Hegel's thought.

progression, and to
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Especially in the earlier
stages, the progression
appears
essentially ambiguous, and
can be interpreted on
different levels
The description of primitive
consciousness and its unfolding
can be
construed at times as referring
to either the history
of the individual

beginning in infancy, or of
the human species "acquiring
culture."
Moreover, aside from providing
any sort of descriptive
historical
account, these episodes perhaps
primarily constitute an expose
of that
way of thinking characterized
by "representation".
The first book of the

P henomenology

the first chapter, "Sense of
Certainty".

is

entitled "Consciousness";

As Hegel

certainty, it is the sensually given
experience of

describes sense
a

consciousness or

mind, which experiences itself as
generally continuous with, and

undifferentiated from, its surroundings.

A developmental psychologist

might liken sense certainty to the experience
of an infant who has not

yet formed "ego boundaries".

A general parallel with the ancient

pre-phi losophic world-orientation is perhaps
obvious as well.
In sense certainty the sensually given
impressions are not

organized into "concepts" which could be used to perceive
the world
as consisting of distinct objects and entities.

the passive absorption of particulate sensations.

might say that this

is

Sense certainty is
For this reason one

the truest experience of the world, since in it

the real contents of the world are presented to consciousness

immediately--"unfi 1 tered" by concepts.

Thus, Hegel says.

Because of its concrete content, sense certainty immediately
appears as the richest kind of knowledge, indeed a knowledge
of infinite wealth for which no bounds can be found...
Moreover, sense certainty appears to be the truest knowledge;
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However. Hegel then imagines
sense certainty asked to
give an
account of its "knowledge”,
to describe this truest
experience of the
world itself. But because
this experience is
completely particulate,
sense certainty is unable to
formulate its experience for
itself or
for others.
For to do so would require
the use of properties or
"universals" to organize and subsume
the sense impressions.
All that
sense certainly is able to manage
is to utter the words
"This", "Here",
or "Now", as if pointing to its
head and saying, "What is
happening
there, at this time, --that is
what

I

know!"

In this way the experience
which at first appeared to be the

richest and most true, e^xpresses itself
as "mere being", as an

undefined general existence.

Furthermore, even by just using the

words "This", "Here", "Now", sense certainly
falsifies its experience.
For according to Hegel, these words too
are universals which subsume
the particulars of sense certainty into
the duration and extention

which define the "mere being".

Hegel

explains.

Of course we do not envisage the universal This
or Being in
general, but we utter the universal; in other words we
do
not strictly say what in this sense certainty we mean
to say.
But language, as we see, is the more truthful; in it, we
ourselves directly refute what we mean to say, and since the
universal is the true [content] of sense certainty and language
expresses this true [content] alone, it is just not possible for
us ever to say, or express in words, a sensuous being that we
mean.o2
In the preface to his Philosophy of Right

,

Hegel makes the famous

statement, "What is rational is actual and what is actual is
rational."

63

In the above context this suggests

that the sensual
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experience which cannot be
formulated or given
expression must remain
a private subjective
certainty which cannot be
tested, or brought to
light and examined, and so
rendered

Vational" and "actual".

Thus, Hegel says, "What is
called the unutterable is
nothing else than
the untrue, the irrational,
what is merely meant [but
is not actually
expressed],
On the other hand, for
Hegel, what is rational and
actually expressed is the
universal-which then emerges as
the truth
of sense certainty. And because
the truth of consciousness
is now the
universal, experience is no longer
immediate and passive, but rather

mediated by that movement of the
mind which negates the particulars
as
such, subsuming them into univorsdls.
The portrayal of sense certainty
appears to allude to various

aspects of ancient Greek thought.

For instance, putting the demand
to

sense certainty to explicitly formulate
and say that knowledge which it

claims to possess, is reminiscent of what
Socrates' philosophy was to
Athens.

In both cases self-consciousness is
introduced by means of

"the universal".

However, if taken too literally, the historical

parallels can be misleading.

Pre-phi losophi

c

,

and probably pre-Homeric,

thought did not consist of some kind of "raw
particulate sense-data":

what Ionian and Socratic philosophy subsumed was not
"sense-data", but

other concepts in their language.
Even interpreted as

a

description of early child development, the

account of sense certainty may be misleading.

For even a newborn

probably does not just passively and indifferently receive impressions
which are then subsumed as the baby develops.

But while the account

of sense certainty may not correspond to anything ever experienced by

:
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actual human beings, it
may still be of
heuristic value.
Perhaps it
'S most useful to think
of Hegel's beginning
point as rather like that
of some of the "social
contract" theorists:
not so much a historical
description as a device for
better understanding our
present thought
and experience.®^ peen
Seen in this
t-hic light
n„k<- n"sense
certainty" appears as a

critique or expose of

a

theory of knowledge earlier
discussed,

according to which the mind

is

an instrument which
reflects the

objects of the world, and language
functions as "a neutral and
transparent" conveyance.
Considered in this way, the
unfolding of sense

certainty can be taken as

a

demonstration of the bankruptcy of

a

theory of knowledge connected with
"representation".
In

the subsequent stage of the
phenomenological progression,

consciousness has shed the skin of sense
certainty, and now takes on
the form of

a

consciousness "perceiving things".

At the stage of

perception", both consciousness and its
object are defined by the act
of subsuming in accordance with an ordering
principle.

By means of

the universal, or defining principle, the
demarcation between self and

world first comes to consciousness, and thus for
Hegel, becomes
actual
With the emergence of the principle, the two moments
which
in their appearing merely occur
also come into being:
one
being the movement of pointing-out or the act of perceiving,
the other being the same movement as a simple event or the
object perceived 66
,

.

Consciousness now does not passively receive sensory impulses,
but actively subsumes them under

a

universal, according to

a

principle.

As a result, the experience of perception is not the meaningless

flurry of sense impressions as before:

"perception is no longer
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something Which just happens
to us like sense
certainty; on the
contrary it is logically
necessitated.
Perception is organized
according to the structure
of concepts and
language.

The logically necessitated
movement of consciousness
which
replaces the nhis" of sense
certainty is now a rthingV
The Thing of
perception is itself a universal,
to which may be referred
other
universals as properties.
Thus, for instance, we may
describe a grain
of salt by attributing to
it whiteness, hardness,
a cubical shape, a
certain weight, etc.

However, when perceiving
consciousness reflects upon the
nature of
Its object, the Thing, it is
beset with the following problem:
is the

Thing itself

a

unity, or

a mul tipi ici

ty-a collection

Perception tries to make sense of
this

quandry; for instance at one

point it thinks that the Thing itself
must be

a

unity, and only

appears multiple because of our own
multiplicity.

considers the Thing as one,
it, see it, feel

it, etc.

of properties.

In other words,

but as appearing multiple because

it

^ hear

However, this reasoning does not hold up.

For perception discovers that as long
as

a

Thing is itself something

determinate--can be distinguished from other things--it
itself must
consist of properties which differentiate it.^^
And so perception struggles:

looking first at its object, then at

itself, and then back again, claiming unity at one
moment, and multi-

plicity the next--never reconciling the two.

Finally, as

occurred in sense certainty, the object of consciousness ceases to be
one of two "moments" from which consciousness moves back and forth,
and

becomes instead that very movement.

The object is now "Force":

the
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relation or movement between
univensals.

Consciousness
constituted not as perception,
but as "understanding".

is

now

As with the account of
sense certainty, that
of perception can be
interpreted as a critique and
expose of early modern
thought.
The
oscillations of perception
strongly resemble some of
the philosophical
problems of the 17th and
18th centuries.
For example, in his 2nd

Meditation Descartes contemplates
the sensible qualities
of a ball of
wax, which all change when
he melts the wax.
Hence Descartes concludes,
that

i^^^ythe

wax is "neither that
softness of honey, nor that

pleasant^scent of flowers, nor that
whiteness, nor that shape, nor
that
sound,
but rather an immaterial
substance.
On the other hand.

Bishop Berkeley says that others
will have it that the word "die"
denotes a subject or substance

predicated of it, and in which they
exist.
This I cannot
comprehend; to me a die seems to be
nothing distinc???™ those
things which are termed its modes
or accidents. 70

Eventually the phenomenological
progression arrives at the point
which explicitly corresponds to the
intellectual life of the early

modern era.

Here consciousness is constituted as
"Observing Reason."

Observing Reason begins in the era of
Descartes, who discovers

indubitable certainty in the existence of his
self-referring thought:
if he simply thinks he exists, he thereby
guarantees the fact of his

existence.

Thus Hegel notes that Observing Reason differs
from all

previous phenomenological stages of consciousness.

Earlier forms of

individuality sought to wrest an independent existence from
their
formative surroundings:

even in their resistance they were defined

by their interaction with a world beyond themselves.

However, with the
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advent of Reason,
consciousness defines itself
as an unshakeably
stable
certainty without reference
to a world in which
it lives.
In Hegelian
language. Reason is "the
first EositiyUy in which
self-consciousness
Jts own self expliriti^/ for
itself.

Consciousness which experiences
and understands itself as
existing detached from the
world thus requires a different
sort of
education from that previously
required.
In this regard. Hegel

contrasts what was needed of
philosophy in antiquity, -distance
from
the immediacy of experience
by means of the universal
and reflection-with what is needed of it in
modernity:
The task nowadays consists not
so much in purging the
individual of an immediate, sensuous
mode of apprehension
substance that is an object of thought
a^d St"th
and
that thinks, but rather in just
the opposite, in freeing
determinant thoughts from their fixity
so as to ^'ve actLlity
to the universal and to impart
^
to it spiritual life. 72
In this

regard Charles Taylor has attempted to
explicate Hegel's

discussion of perceiving consciousness.

Taylor takes this discussion

to be an expose of a "contemplative" theory
of experience that is in

Its modern form derived from empiricism and
cartesianism, and which

conceives of experience "as consisting of the passive
reception of
sense data, so that the nature of experience itself is
not bound up

with the way we interact and deal with the world.
tive

This "contempla-

understanding of experience essentially imposes or projects

a

particular experience of the thinker qua thinker upon the whole of
learning and living in the world, and has consequently run up against
a

number of problems,

prehension of

a

historically, one of which has been the com-

"Thing" and its properties.
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As

a

n«ber of modern intellectual
movements

have tried to show,

our understanding and
knowledge of something

is generally not
given by
Observation and contemplation,
but by our embodied
interaction with
the stuff of the world.
Thus, for instance, the
concept of a thing
integrating a number of properties
may result from activity
including
scraping off some surface, and
thus effecting an object's
shape and
size, and possibly the color,
taste, smell, and texture
as well.

However, this

was posing, i.e.:

in

itself does not really solve
tte question that perception

"What is the thing?-a multiplicity
merely synthe-

sized by consciousness, or

else?"

a

unity apprehended diversely,
or something

Futhermore, the use of

be known is

itself misleading:

IS not the seeing,

a

"Thing" as an example of something
to
for the basis of most of what we
know

sniffing, and scratching of objects,
but speaking

and acting with other members of our
cultural community.

Some first

steps towards understanding in what ways,
and to what extent, what we
know and who we are derive from our practices
and membership in

a

culture, are shown in the stage which follows
Observing Reason-"Active Reason".

At the stage of Active Reason, consciousness abandons
trying to
find meaning ready-made by means of observation, and instead
seeks, so
to speak,

to put its stamp on the world", by means of action.

Most

of the details of this stage need not concern us here, but the general

upshot of the section

is

of the utmost importance.

As Taylor notes,

this section essentially divides the entire work in two parts.

discussion clearly pointing

a

In a

critical finger at Kant, the acting

individual here discovers that his own "sound Reason and intelligent
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insight"

are not sufficient to
determine ethical conduct.
According
to Hegel any legislation
which is merely the
product of an individual's
Reason is a "tyrannical
insolence which makes caprice
into a law and
ethical
behavior into obedience to
such caprice.
Pies of this sort entail no
force of compulsion or
obligation.

These
Hegel contrasts with what he
calls "commandments"-laws
issuing from
the ethical principles of
a community, which
precede the individual,
and are simply given by the
culture.
Concerning these laws Hegel says,
it is not a commandment, which
only ought to be:

valid."

it is and is

Furthermore, Hegel argues that
obedience to the existent

law is

not the serving of a master whose
commandments were arbitrary
consciousness] would not rLogn^L
itse f
On the contrary, laws are the
thoughts of its own
absolute consciousness, thoughts which are
immediately its own.

'77

This is to say that, for instance, the
members of our culture

generally do not refrain from infanticide
because of the vigilance of
some external authority, but because of who
they are, and what they

think;

and who they are, and what they think, are largely
products of

cultural membership.
is

Thus what emerges from the stage of active Reason

an understanding of how fully the individual

is

dependent upon, and determined by his place within

wrapped up in,
a

culture.

Indeed, Hegel's understanding that the philosopher like anyone

else is fundamentally conditioned and bound by his cultural environ-

ment leads him to formulate

a

philosophical approach distanct from that

which sought to correct ordinary worldly experience and usage.
Hegel's philosophy is not meant to correct those experiences and
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usages, but rather to
make explicit and
conscious, what in them
is
^Plicit and unconscious: his
philosophy is that "owl
of Minerva
Which flies only at dusk."
As such, this philosophy
recognizes a
dependence on the worldly
thought and activity
within society and cultuTG to providG its
"matGrial."
This understanding dictates
the structure of the
Phenomenology

.

The discussions of each
stage of consciousness
are not meant to be
critiques of that stage, so
much as exposes-what are
now sometimes
known as "imminent critiques."
That is, the various stages
of consciousness are not subjected
to the criticisms which
occur to us, who
are presumably at some
"higher " stage.
Rather, each discussion is
supposed to merely describe how
this mode of consciousness
becomes

unworkable for Usejf.
consciousness.

Hegel

The criticisms evolve from
within the given
says,

we do not need to import criteria,
or make use of our
own bright Ideas and thoughts
during the course of the
inquiry; It is precisely when we
leave these aside that we

and^for itse?^?^^^^^'^^
That is, for example, only when
philosophers cease "inventing",
are they then able to discover the
already existing criteria implicit
and actually determinate for himself
and others within the culture.

Kant described his insight that the truth
of objects is to be

found by consideration of our sensual intuition,
as

a

sort of second

Copernican revol ution--the analogy being that in both
cases events are

explained by reconsideration of the vantage of the
spectator.
not be stretching things too far to say that Hegel's
thinking

It may

.
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represents

a

kind of third Copernican
revolution.

to continue with fruitful
philosophical

inquiry, the philosopher
is

forced to intellectually
resituate himself as

communuy-sharing with others
among other things,

a

a

For here, in order

a

member of an historical

non-philosophical existence
involving,

common language and pattern
of interactions,

which fundamentally shape
and govern his thought
and being.
By introducing self-conscious
consideration of the place of the

philosopher in the way he did,
Hegel opened
thi nkers

a

door for later

CHAPTER

IV

discussion III

one .odern philosopher
often compared with
Hegel is Wittgenstein
On the other hand. Erich
Heller lihens Wittgenstein
to Nietzsche, on
account of their shared
conception of their thinking
as representing a
new and destructive force
in the established
world of thought. Just
as
Nietzsche described hi.self
as dynamite for the
world of his contemporaries. so Wittgenstein
undertakes to initiate an
intellectual revolution
which will shake Western
thought as its foundations.
Heller relates that
Wittgenstein "felt as though he
were writing for people
who would think
in a quite different way.
breathe a different air of life
from that of
present day men; for people of a
different culture.
Like Socrates, Hegel, and a
number of other philosophers,
Wittgen-

stein seeks not so much to instruct
us, as to reveal us to
ourselves.

However, the way in which Wittgenstein
envisions the task of self-con-

sciousness differs greatly from his
predecessors.

For instance, for

both Socrates and Hegel, knowledge
which could not give

of itself did not deserve the name "knowledge".
"knowledge" is not actual, but "merely meant".

a

As Hegel

verbal account

puts it, such

In contrast,

Wittgen-

stein asks us to compare knowing and saying the
following:
how many feet high Mont Blanc is-how the word "game" is used-how a clarinet sounds.
He then remarks, "If you are surprised that someone can know

something and not be able to say it, you are perhaps thinking of
case like the first.

Certainly not one like the third.
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Aga,„ Wittgenstein
differs

fron,

Socrates, Hege,

and .uch of the
rest Of the Western
intellectual tradition,
as to the for. which
philosophical knowledge is
expected to take. Since
Socrates it has become
.

axiomatic that the answers
to questions of the
kind, "What is the
nature
Wittgenstein's more "down
to earth" suggested
replacement, "how is the word
'

used?") take the form of

pie which unites the concept's
various instances.

a

princi-

As Socrates insists.

"1

did not ask you to tell
me one or two of all the
many pious actions
that there are; I want to know
what is characteristic of
piety which

makes all pious actions pious.
But let us turn, with Wittgenstein,
to the second example he
gave
of knowing, and examine the
nature of games:

proceedings that we call "games"
I
mean
board-games, card-games, ball -games,
Olympic games, and so on
What IS common to them allT-Don't
say:
"There must be slethina
common, or they would not be called
•games-"-but look and see
whether there is anything common to call.
-For if you look at
them you will not see something that
is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole
series of them at that
To
look;-Lock for example at boa^d-jLs.
with their multifarious relationships.
Now pass to card-gaLs;
here you find many correspondences with
the first group, but many
common features drop out, and others appear.
When we pass next to
ball-pmes, much that is common is retained, but much
is lost.—
Are they all 'amusing'? Compare chess with
noughts and crosses.
Or IS there always winning and losing, or
competition between
players? Think of patience.
In ball games there is winning and
losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall
and catches
it again, this feature has disappeared.
Look at the parts played
by skill and luck; and at the difference between skill
in chess
and skill in tennis.
Think now of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses
here is the element of amusement, but how many other characteristic features have disappeared!
And we can go through the many,
many other groups of games in the same way; can see how
similarities crop up and disappear. 83

Hence Wittgenstein describes concepts as functioning not by means
of

a

common defining principle, but like

a

thread which holds together
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not because there is
one fiber which runs
throughout the whole,
but
because there is an
overlapping and twisting
of o„e fi,er upon
another^^
In th,s way the var,ous
occas,ons of a concept's
use for. a criss-

crossing network constituting
what Wittgenstein calls
a "family
resemblance." We learn
concepts by having
experience with these different instances of their
use. Andfromthe
theoretical point ofview,
thereis
nothing else to be known.

Thus, while we can of
course criticize and

reject inappropriate uses of

a

concept, philosophy does
not have a leg

to stand on in criticizing
the established instances
of use in general:
It simply is the conscious
expression of our more or less
established

behavior in these instances.
A number of recent philosophers
are at one with Wittgenstein
in
holding that much of our knowledge
is not entirely governed
by rules
and principles.®®

In fact, they argue practical

knowledge or "know-

how" could not even survive a
translation into an explicit formulation

or system of rules.

It

is

precisely the unsystematic or "open-ended"

character of such knowledge which allows
us to project it into always
differing circumstances, and thus makes it
of use.

A rule or system of

rules could not accomplish what this "less
defined", tacit, experential

knowledge allows us to do.

Hence the Wittgensteinian philosopher must

not only abandon instructing the ordinary cultural
norms of speech and

action, but also the Hegelian role of bestowing rationality
and

actuality on the as of yet incomplete, since merely implicit, cultural
life of his community.

everything as it is"

Wittgenstein writes that philosophy, "leaves
--except, as his commentators have hastened to

add, our understanding.
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Earlier

th,s essay we have
spoken of an intellectual
perspective
wh,ch conceives of
convention, or custo.-that
which defines and unites
a co™unaty-as
something to be escaped,
if one is to reach
the truth of
things.
However, Wittgenstein
understands social conventions,
and in
particular, language, to be
more than a set of
constructs imposed upon

our independently existing
identities and world.

He holds language to
be in many cases fundamentally
bound up with our selves,
and our world.

We are used to thinking
that the world is what
it is, despite what
we or anybody else call it.
But on further examination,
this is not
always so clear.
For instance, according
to Benjamin Lee Whorf,
there
is in the Hopi language no
word corresponding to our
notion of time as
a

uniform continuous duration.

"Time" for the Hopis varies from
person

to person, does not admit of
simultaneity, nor of plurality:

do not say, "I stayed five days,"
but

"I

the Hopi

left on the fifth day."

Hopi

verbs have no tense, but always indicate
what sort of certainty the

speaker intends his statement to have:
event, expecting an event, or making

a

whether he is reporting an
generalization about events.

Apparently the Hopi understanding of "time"

is as consistent and

coherent as our own, and they have no experience that
something
lacking in it.
ture?

So what is "time" independent of

(If you are still

a

is

language and cul-

tempted to suppose that there is something

existing "out there" that Indo-European and Hopi "time" concepts each
only capture an aspect of, perhaps you will be less so inclined after
the final

section of this paper.)

If language can be seen to be largely determinant in certain

cases taken from the natural world, so much the more so with examples
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-volv ,„9

the cultural world.

For instance. Hanna
Pitkin notes that

because three different
German words are
translated by the single
English word "representation",
for the English
speaker, unlike the
German speaker, "the way
a painting or a
painter or an actor

represents'
Congressman

is

'

part of the same concept
as the way an agent
or a
represents
What
wnai representation
reDrpqpnt;^f-!m
^
is depends
on what
•

role the word "representation"
plays in a language.

Hence an investigation into
language need not be "merely
about
words"-but about the world too.
Wittgenstein says. "Grammar tells
what kind of object anything
is. "5°
What grammar-the conditions
for words' appropriate use-tells
us is in many cases not all
that is
to be known about something.

But when we do philosophy, and
inquire

concerning things' essence or nature,
we are in fact asking questions
about our language, whether we are
aware of it or not.
The fact that what anything's
essence is, is specified by "mere

conventions" in

a

language does not mean that the world
is "arbitrary'

that we could change things' meanings
if we just decided and agreed
to.

At one point Wittgenstein introduces the
question whether human

agreement determines what things are.

He answers himself that what

determines is "not agreement in opinions but in
forms of life."^^
What Wittgenstein is saying is that the conventions
which govern what
our words mean are rooted in the matrix of our cultural
practices--

what we do, and hence, who we are (this will be further explained).
To change one would be to change the others, and we are not entirely
at liberty to change any of these (could you just "choose" to think

and see the world like

a

Hopi?).
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Just as we are not
entirely at liberty to
alter or reject what
has been given to us
in the common
possession of a language,
so too

IS

a

thinker or Dhilo'^nnhpr
P er

conventions of his culture.

-hn

^

a

i

large extent bound by
the everyday

And unless he recognizes,
and is atten-

tive to, this fact, he will risk misunderstanding
both himself and
h's subject matter.
For instance, Pitkin
cites and discusses Robert
Dahl's essay, "The Concept
of Power."
this essay Dahl seeks
to
uncover and explicate the
underlying idea of a number
of concepts
including influence, control,
and authority.
According to Dahl,
what underlies these concepts
is "power":
the ability to get others
to do things they would not
otherwise do-and Dahl suggests
that he
will use all these notions
essentially interchangeably.

m

However, Pitkin shows that words
such as "power" and "influence"
are not really interchangeable.

As she demonstrates, we speak
of

"indirect power", but not "indirect
influence"; one can have "the
power of (attorney, the sword, the
purse)", but not "the influence of
(anything)," and so on.

Moreover, Pitkin points out that in
spite of

himself, Dahl does not go on to use the
terms interchangeably:

his

thought and speech continues to be guided by
the distinctions given by
his language.

Thus he does not speak of Senators'

"power" over the

Senate, but of their "influence."®^
Pitkin explains that in truth these terms are not
even strictly

comparable:

they work in quite different ways, "move in different

dimensions.

Pitkin notes that "[t]he social science literature

is full

of attempts either to distinguish them in simple ways, or to

make one of them into

a

sub-category of the other."

However, all
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such attempts

fan

to grasp the complex
ways in which such
concepts

are actually determined
and distinguished.

Consequently, while these
thinkers' conclusions
point one way. they
themselves continue in

"Other-directed

by the regularities
and distinctions
existing in the
language and culture of
which they are inescapably
a part.

Hannah Arendt occupied

a

place in the forefront
of modern

Philosophers who stress the
thinker's need to understand
his or her
cultural membership.
It is perhaps then
a testament to the
difficulty
of escaping certain
implications of our language
and philosophical
habits of thought, that this
great theorist did not always
see where
and how to look, to do just
this.
In combating "reductionist"
ways of

understanding human conduct,
Arendt describes "action" as
a uniquely
human phenomenon, requiring
distinct intellectual treatment.^®
However, Pitkin suggests that
this is not so; we use the word
"action"
not only with respect to humans,
but also with respect to animals,
and even inanimate matter, as
when we speak of the action of
water on

sandstone cliffs.

So action is not something
"distinctively human",

and Arendt was wrong in saying it
is.^^

What is startling about Pitkin's criticism

is

that it says little

that anyone, including Arendt, did not
already know.

It would be

clear to most any competent English speaker
that Arendt
"action" in

a

way different from ordinary speech.

immediately obvious

is

that this matters:

is

using

What might not be

that in discussing the

nature of action Arendt is bound by the ordinary uses
of that term,
and related words, as these uses are established in
the language.
it is these uses which tell

us what kind of thing action is.

But

Or, in
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the words

(if not exactly the
deeds) of Hegel, only
when we leave

aside our bright ideas
do we "succeed in
contemplating the matter
as
it is in and for
itself.

Finally we return to an idea
which Wittgenstein calls
“one of the
great sources of philosophical
bewi

Idermenf^S-the idea that the

truth of

a

concept is its correspondence
to

a

referent.

According

to his view words serve
as labels for things,
and when assembled into

sequences form propositions which
describe and assert.

It was

earlier
here suggested that this view
constitutes an imposition or
projection
of characteristically philosophic
or scientific activity upon
the mani
fold and varied practices of a
culture.

Thus Wittgenstein calls our

attention to the variety of linguistic
practices, or what he calls
"language games", in our culture:

Reivew the multiplicity of language-games
in the following
examples, and in others:
Giving orders, and obeying them-Describing the appearance of an object, or giving
its
measurements-Constructing an object from a description (a drawinq)-Reporting an event-Speculating about an event-Forming and testing a hypothesis-Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and
diagrams-Making up a story; and reading it-Play-acti ng-Singing catches-Guessing riddles-Making a joke; telling it-Solving a problem in practical arithmetic-Translating from one language into another-Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying--

.
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Wittgenstein follows

-- --

thic:

i.-c-t-^u
list
with
the comment that
it is

0.

...t ...cians ..e
^

fa, lea to necognize
the

--

saia atcnt

ana sentences,

.e

stnnctnne ot

P--sop.ens .a.e tnaaUtona„.

United scope of

the labelling on
nefenning
function of language
because of their "unduly
narrow focus
for Clearly "Hello"
does not refer to
anything.
Or, .ore significantly.
the sentence "George
is coding for a
visit" .ay refer to
George (as
a response to the
question, "Will you be
seeing George?"); but
it may
not refer at all. but
George (as a response
to the guestioh.
"Who is coming to visit?"). 103
^he point here is that
it will be

id^

^possible
without

a

to uhderstand the nature
of our concepts and
language

more perspicacious view
of words' uses in the
different

contexts in which we actually
learn and use them.
But doing this, and overcoming
the generalized conception
of the

labelling function of language
is not simply

a

matter of unlearning

a

mistake made by philosophers of
antiquity and passed down from
generation to generation within the
discipline.

For us, as for those

ancient philosophers, the confusion
here results from implications
of
our language which mislead us when
we undertake reflection and

philosophy.

Wittgenstein says, "A picture held us
captive.

And

we could not get outside it, for
it lay in our language and language

seemed to repeat it to us inexorably
How then are we to escape this picture,
inexorably given us by

our language?

For one thing, Wittgenstein suggests we replace
our

customary inquiry, "What is the

meaning of

which may
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lead us to presuppose
the general referring
function of language
("a word's meaning is

"How is the word

the thing it refers
to"), with the question

'
.

,,coh?m
used?

Wittgenstein likens the words

of our language to a
collection of different tools
in a toolbox:'"’^
we might say that there
are labels in the box,
but much more too.
He also compares words
to handles in a
locomotive cabin:

ped.r’But oie1r?he^hanr

an effect only so long as it
is moved to and fro^lOb

Wittgenstein attempts to illustrate
how words can function by
means of an example of what he asks
us to imagine as
tive language.

a

complete primi-

The entire language consists of
four words:

"slab", "pillar", and "beam"-and
serves as

between

a

builder and an assistant.

a

"block",

means of communication

When the builder needs something,

he calls out one of these words, and
the assistant brings the appro-

priate object.

What, then, in this language can the

call

"slab!"

be said to mean or refer to?

Perhaps we are inclined to think, as Wittgenstein
once thought,
that the call corresponds to

a

certain idea or image which somehow

passes before the mind when spoken or understood.

But for the builder

or assistant, what passes before the mind may be "I
hope this will

fit

,

or "Where is that no good assistant?", or most anything else;

in any case it would not necessarily tell

"slab!".

us anything about the call

And supposing that the image or meaning must then be present
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to the mind
subconsciously is as
Pitkin understates
states, "not
n ,
not „
very help08
,

J

.

magine Wittgenstein's
language game except
with the
assistant replaced by a
trained dog, and the
calls replaced with
Claps:
one, two, three, or
four.
What is the meaning
or image which
a single clap
consciously, or subconsciously,
presents to the dog's
mind? Wouldn't we do
better here to think
of the clap, call,
or

Similar command in our own
language, as

a

kind of "signal" which

people (usually people)
learn to use and respond
to as part of
certain activity?

a

Pitkin introduces the
conception of language as
"signals" and
for doing things, not
just labels for referring,
by means of
J.L. Austin's notion of
"performatives". Austin observes
that

certain verbs in the first
person are not used to describe
or refer,
but to perform the action
which
they name.

(under proper conditions)
one.

is

not to describe

a

promise, but to make

As Austin explored his notion
of performatives, he came to
find

that such functions are quite
widespread.
say

Thus to say, "I promise"

"I

promise" to make

a

For instance one need not

promise; one could say "OK", "you
bet", or

most anything under appropriate
circumstances
words will more commonly occur in

a

Thus while some

performative linguistic environ-

ment--words such as "accusing", "honoring",
"accepting", "toasting",
etc. --most any words can be used to
perform actions and so may be

performative to greater or lesser extents.
Once we have begun to grasp that words do more than
label and

describe, we will question whether substantives are always
used to
name things, and verbs to name activities.

One particular confusion
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which we may now avoid
is the presupposition
that verbs which do
not
name physical activities
must then name
.'mental activities
or states"
It may seem to us
almost beyond doubt
that '.thinking...
..meaning"

Veading", "remembering",
etc., are mental
activities.

But this is

rarely the case.

Consider an example
Wittgenstein gives in order
to demonstrate
the grammar of "meaning".
He describes a scene
in which one person
instructs another to write
out the series .2, which
the second person
does up to 1000.
But at this point he
continues the series 1000,

1004,’

1008, etc.

Consequently, the first person
corrects him, saying that
he IS not acting as he was
meant to. Wittgenstein now
asks the first
person if when he instructed
the other if he meant
that 1002 should
follow 1000, and also that 1868
follow 1866, and 100036 follow
100034, and "an infinite number of
such propositions?"!"
the imaginary interlocutor
responds. "But

when

I

I

Eventually

already knew, at the time

gave the order, that he ought
to write 1002 after 1000."^^^

To which Wittgenstein answers,
"Certainly, and you can also say
that

you meant it then; only you should
not let yourself be misled by the
grammar of the words "know" and "mean".^^^
that "meaning" is used here not to describe

For Wittgenstein argues
a

particular mental

experience, activity, or state, but rather to
make the claim that "If
I

had been asked what number should be written
after 1000,

I

should

have replied '1002'

Similarly, Pitkin, again leaning on Austin, explains the
grammar
of "knowing":
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state
o?'m-nd;'we'L'°aUrmah
Saying we feel quite sure
commitment,
Lv Hp^ k
saying we know does more
than that
It means issuing a
f^ething different,
certain kind
kind of responsibility
^ certain
for the truth
When I say, "I know^^
give "thers
^
!^’
my author! tv for say-ieT thit th li mfwnrf
others
[th^tfm;? ?I have SliiBTTknow

T

•

I

Hence knowing is not something
like

a

stronger version of

believing.

And if the word knowing"
were to disappear from our
language, it might not mean
that we would be any less
able to
describe our mental states;
but it might indicate that
we would have
lost the cultural practice
of giving our authority
to others to act
upon.
If we fail

to understand Wittgenstein
here, than knowing,

meaning, etc. will appear as
mysterious "inner processes", which
others must perhaps only infer from
our outer behavior.
But a

Wittgensteinian understanding may help
to show us that with respect
to these concepts we are not
necessarily enigmas to each other.

fact, in many respects Wittgenstein's
thinking implies
of problems of intellectual

a

In

reformulation

isolation from others and the world--

problems of philosophical skepticism, subjectivism
and relativism.
However, for the purposes of this essay, it will
be enough to explore
how Wittgensteinian philosophy can clarify one
area of our language
in

this respect.
If we simply assumed that words are labels, and if
we then

witnessed occasions of their labeling, we might conclude that we had
thus observed the words' meanings.

Hence in certain social
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conditions we might be led
to sav
say that

"•

4.-

justice

is

the interest of the

stronger" (Thrasy.achus)”."6
(Hobbes).

in fact something
like this perspective
is entrenched in

the positivistic common
sense of the social
sciences.

According to
this perspective, statements
about the world can be
exhaustively

divided between those of "fact"
and those of "value".

The former are

considered as descriptions or
assertions in principle
verifiable by
observable evidence like any
scientific claim. The latter,
while
sometimes appearing similar to
the former, actually merely
express
subjective preferences; consequently,
they cannot be verified, nor
serve as the basis of any rational
discussion or conclusions.
However, the category of words
and statements "expressing
value"
is

in fact a mixed bag,

category of "facts".

united only by their non-membership
in the

And such

a

categorization may obscure important

differences among these "value words".

For instance words such as

"just" or "good" differ from words which
actually are generally used
to express preferences and tastes, such
as "pleasant" or "delicious",
in that the former can be used to
invoke standards.

It is the exis-

tence of more or less established standards within
our language which

allows us to make claims which are based not only
on our likes and
di si

i

kes--al 1 ow us to speak, as Kant said, in the "universal
voice.
Thus while one can legitimately support the statement
"Canary wine

is

pleasant" by saying, "Well,

statement that it is "good".
(a

work of art

ment, "Well,

I

is

I

like it," one cannot so defend a

To follow a claim that a wine is good

beautiful, an action is just, etc.) with the state-

like it," is not a defense, but a retreat.

Similarly,
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while it makes sense
in the
rc:t ra
we fi
first
case to say, "Well,
it is so to
me.
It does not in the
latter case(s).”9
+.

The defense of claims
i.p,yi„g standards
requires knowledge of
the subject and what
will qualify as
legitimate and relevant
appeals
to those standards.
And not everyone has
the knowledge, and
thus the
authority, to make any
such claim.
In order to
authoritatively claim
that, for instance, a
dive was good-not
just exciting, say-one
has
to know something about
divingJ^O
knowledgeable and
initiated will not always
agree in their judgements,
they generally do
agree as to what are
relevant concerns. Hence,
in diving, the
straightness of entry into
the water is a relevant
criteria; the speed
of entry is not. What is
to be a legitimate
standard is sometimes
itself a matter of debate,
but as Pitkin says, "not
just anything you
do will be challenging
standards, not just any challenge
will be a

proposal for new standards.

We already have, as it
were, some implicit

notions of what will count as.
..a new application of

concept."

a

familiar

For to appropriately invoke
words implying standards,

we must be able to reasonably
connect our present application
with the
previously established and implicit
standards.
In

order to comprehend the logic and
rationality of the various

areas of human conduct and language,
one must see how in fact they
do operate-not simply judge according
to criteria from other regions
of our culture.

Again, as Pitkin says:

The fact that we speak differently about
art than about
physical events is notproof that esthetic
discourse is
less objective than scientific discourse.
On the contrary,
we need to look and see how objectivity functions,
what it
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what tationality^^retMcs"'i'ooks''l1l<*^*'^''

understand

What Pitkin and Wittgenstein
show is that if our
thought is really
to grapple with the self
and world it intends
to reflect upon, we
must
recognize that we can only
do so from a position
not above or outside,
but within a culture.
Language, and the consequent
notions we
developed concerning reflection,
directed us elsewhere.
of meaning as a universal
principal

Our conception

led us to hypestatize a
theoretical

knowledge which both transcended,
and served to definitively
"rule and
measure", ordinary practical
knowledge.
Our understanding of convention led us to consider the
cultural and the "real" as
necessarily
opposed. And our notion that
words represent things led us
to see
our

relationship to the world as
perpetually contemplative, "intellectual",
and one step removed, when in
fact it is often immediate
because

actively engaged in the manifold
practices of

a

culture.

Furthermore,

this particular perspective led us
to disparage the sphere of
action

for then not conforming to the
standards of the sphere of observation
and analysis.

For these and other reasons, the
philosopher, who, as

such, undertakes a particular and distinctive
human practice, has need
of finding his place amongst others
participating in various different

practices, many of which he shares with them.

Philosophy

is

needing

to teach itself how to see, in Wittgenstein's
words, "from close
"123
to.

Moreover, despite the fact that the human subject of this essay
has been almost exclusively "the philosopher", the relevance of
the

undGrs tandi ngs discussGd

Iigtg

GxtGnds bGyond thG livGS of profGSSGd
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Phnosophers.

Our culture 1s increasingly
one of social Isolation,

reflection, and self-consciousness.

experience with
IS

a

Camus dramatically
portrays this

scene from the life of
the modern Individual:

talking on the telephone
behind

a glass

"A man

partition; you cannot hear

him, but you see his
Incomprehensible dumb show:

you wonder why he Is

alive."

Clearly rethinking our concepts
will not abolish modern
selfestrangement and cultural alienation.
But our concepts can distort
our
perception somewhat like Camus'
glass partition: making the
world seem
foreign and nonsensical In ways
It really is not.
For either the

philosopher or the reflective
individual, what

a

rethinking of reflec-

tion may offer is a more clear
understanding of how and what we
share
in a cultural

community, and what in truth divides
us.
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